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EVANS V. MICHIGAN: THE IMPACT
OF JUDICIAL ERROR ON DOUBLE
JEOPARDY PROTECTION
ZI-XIANG SHEN
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects against
double jeopardy, the retrying of a criminal defendant for the same
1
offense after conviction or acquittal. But does the Fifth Amendment
protect a criminal defendant when a trial judge mistakenly requires
the prosecution to prove an element that does not exist and, as a
result, orders a directed verdict in favor of the defendant? The
Michigan Supreme Court’s answer was a definitive “no,” interpreting
the double jeopardy protection narrowly and holding that such a
2
decision was not an “acquittal” barring retrial. Because even
erroneous acquittals cannot be retried, state courts—wanting to
preserve the possibility of retrial for public policy reasons—readily
avoid defining trial rulings as “acquittals.” Strong public policy
rationales support the Michigan Supreme Court’s interpretation. The
validity of these rationales, however, rests on the trial court making a
legal, rather than a factual, error—a distinction not yet drawn by the
3
U.S. Supreme Court. In Evans v. Michigan, the Court will decide
whether to recognize such a distinction in judicial rulings for purposes
of extending double jeopardy protection.
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”).
2. People v. Evans, 810 N.W.2d 535, 536–37 (Mich. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Evans v.
Michigan, 132 S. Ct. 2753 (U.S. June 11, 2012) (No. 11-1327).
3. Evans v. Michigan, No. 11-1327 (U.S. argued Nov. 6, 2012).
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 2008, Lamar Evans was arrested in connection with a house
4
fire. Evans was charged under the Michigan Penal Code with
“willfully or maliciously” burning “any building or other real
5
property.” The two arresting police officers testified at Evans’s trial
that they had observed a house on fire and, upon investigating, saw
6
Evans running away from the house with a gasoline can. They further
testified that after apprehending Evans, he confessed to burning down
7
the house. The fire department’s subsequent arson investigation
8
concluded that the fire had been deliberately set. At the time of the
fire, no one lived in the house, and the house lacked utility
9
connections. However, the owner was in the process of purchasing
10
the house and had begun moving in his belongings.
The trial judge granted Evans’s motion for a directed verdict
11
following the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief. Evans
contended that the jury instructions showed that the charged offense
required, as a necessary element, that the building in question not be
a dwelling; however, the State’s evidence showed that the building
12
was a dwelling. The State argued that whether or not the building
was a dwelling was not an element of the offense—the building just
had to be a “structure”—and that the jury instructions were only a
13
guide. The trial judge disagreed with the prosecution, referring to the
jury instructions as “not a guide” but rather as “what is required by
14
law.” The judge also read the statutory language to mean that
because the State charged Evans under “burning other real property”
15
and not “burning [a] dwelling house,” the State had to prove the
16
building was not a dwelling.

4. Evans, 810 N.W.2d at 537.
5. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.73 (West 2012).
6. Evans, 810 N.W.2d at 537.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 539.
12. See id. at 537 (describing Evans’s motion for a directed verdict following the close of
the prosecution’s case-in-chief).
13. Id. at 537–38.
14. Id. at 538.
15. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.72 (West 2012).
16. See Evans, 810 N.W.2d at 538–39 (quoting the colloquy between the trial judge and
counsel).
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17

The State appealed, seeking to retry Evans. The Michigan Court
18
of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling. The appellate court
19
found it “undisputed” that the trial judge had erroneously required
the State to prove the building was not a dwelling. Furthermore, the
appellate court concluded that the legal error meant the trial court’s
ruling was not an acquittal barring retrial under the Double Jeopardy
20
21
Clause. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Double Jeopardy Clause Protection Against Retrial Following
Acquittal
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
22
limb.” The U.S. Supreme Court has construed this clause, known as
the Double Jeopardy Clause, to provide three categorical protections
for criminal defendants: (1) protection against multiple prosecutions
for the same offense; (2) protection against a second prosecution for
the same offense after conviction; and (3) protection against a second
23
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. Evans will require
the Supreme Court to consider the scope of this last protection.
The Court has long held that an acquittal is final and cannot be
reviewed without violating a defendant’s constitutional right to be
24
protected against double jeopardy. According to the Court, “[a]t the
heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely
to subject the citizen to a second trial for the same offense would arm

17. Id. at 539.
18. People v. Evans, 794 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d, 810 N.W.2d 535
(Mich. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Evans v. Michigan, 132 S. Ct. 2753 (U.S. June 11, 2012)
(No. 11-1327).
19. Id. at 852.
20. See Evans, 810 N.W.2d at 539 (“[T]he panel concluded that double-jeopardy principles
did not bar retrial because the trial court had not resolved a factual element necessary to
establish a conviction.”).
21. Id. at 549.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
23. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); see Notes and Comments, Twice in
Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 265–66 (1965) (outlining the three central double jeopardy
prohibitions).
24. See Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896) (“The verdict of acquittal was final,
and could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting him twice in jeopardy, and
thereby violating the [C]onstitution.”).
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25

Government with a potent instrument of oppression.” This double
jeopardy protection also serves important interests of finality in
26
judicial proceedings and the preservation of the integrity of verdicts.
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has also treated judicial
acquittals the same as jury acquittals for purposes of double jeopardy
27
protection. In the central case United States v. Martin Linen Supply
28
Co., the Court held that a trial court ruling is an “acquittal” meriting
double jeopardy protection if it “represents a resolution, correct or
29
not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.” In
that case, the trial court had entered a judgment of acquittal under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) after discharging the
deadlocked jury and determining that the state’s evidence was legally
30
insufficient to sustain a conviction. The state appealed the judgment,
but the Fifth Circuit held that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred
appeal because it would allow the defendants to be tried a second
31
time. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court’s
32
ruling constituted an “acquittal” for double jeopardy purposes. The
Court emphasized that it was the trial judge’s substantive resolution
of the charged offense’s factual elements that deemed it an acquittal,
33
rather than the label of the ruling.
The Court’s emphasis that even erroneous acquittals preclude
retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause was important to Martin
25. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977).
26. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957) (“[T]he State . . . should not
be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby . . . compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.”).
27. See Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467 (2005) (“[W]e have long held that the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits reexamination of a court-decreed
acquittal to the same extent it prohibits reexamination of an acquittal by jury verdict.”).
However, as the United States notes, as amicus curiae, this aspect of the Court’s Double
Jeopardy Clause jurisprudence is somewhat controversial. See Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 29, Evans v. Michigan, No. 11-1327 (U.S. June 11,
2012) (describing commentators’ observations that “when the Court summarily equated a
judge’s insufficiency ruling with a jury’s verdict of acquittal, it gave . . . virtually no reason at all
for that treatment”).
28. 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
29. Id. at 571.
30. Id. at 565–66 & nn.2–3.
31. Id. at 567.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 571 (“[W]hat constitutes an ‘acquittal’ is not to be controlled by the form of
the judge’s action. Rather, we must determine whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its
label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of
the offense charged.”).
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Linen’s holding and particularly relevant to Evans. Though this
34
position has been heavily criticized, the Court has continued to
recognize that the Martin Linen standard applies to a multitude of
35
erroneous rulings. In Arizona v. Rumsey, the Court held that the trial
court effectively “acquitted” the defendant of the death penalty by
misinterpreting the sentencing statute and finding a lack of
aggravating circumstances; the trial court was thus barred on remand
36
37
from setencing the defendant to death. In Smalis v. Pennsylvania,
the Court held that a trial court’s grant of defendants’ demurrer
38
constituted an acquittal barring retrial. Further, the trial court’s
potentially erroneous requirement that the prosecution show a higher
degree of recklessness than was statutorily necessary to prove third39
degree murder did not affect the ruling’s status as an acquittal. The
ruling was an acquittal because “[w]hat the demurring defendant
seeks is a ruling that as a matter of law the State’s evidence is
40
insufficient to establish his factual guilt.”
41
More recently, in Smith v. Massachusetts, the Court held that a
trial judge acquitted a defendant of an unlawful firearms possession
charge when she ruled that the state had not proven a gun barrel was
less than sixteen inches long, as required by statute, even though the
judge later orally “reversed” her ruling upon reconsideration of the
42
trial testimony. According to the Court, the trial judge’s initial ruling
was final and constituted an acquittal, because it was entered under a
criminal procedure rule “direct[ing] the trial judge to enter a finding
of not guilty ‘if the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to
43
sustain a conviction.’” Whether it was correct or not, the ruling

34. E.g., Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 135 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[The
defendant] no more would be put in jeopardy a second time when retried because of a mistake
of law in his favor, than he would be when retried for a mistake that did him harm.”).
35. 467 U.S. 203 (1984).
36. Id. at 211.
37. 476 U.S. 140 (1986).
38. See id. at 144 (“The Pennsylvania Supreme Court erred in holding that, for purposes of
considering a plea of double jeopardy, a defendant who demurs at the close of the prosecution’s
case in chief elects to seek dismissal on grounds unrelated to his factual guilt or innocence.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
39. Id. at 144 n.7.
40. Id. at 144.
41. 543 U.S. 462 (2005).
42. See id. at 465–67 (holding that the trial judge’s initial ruling, based on her finding that
the prosecution had not presented any evidence showing the defendant possessed a weapon
with a barrel less than sixteen inches long, constituted an acquittal).
43. Id. at 467 (quoting MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a)).
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resolved the defendant’s guilt or innocence on the charge and was
44
thus an acquittal.
Conversely, the Court’s precedent does provide some guidance on
when the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial following trial
court orders that terminate proceedings before a jury verdict is
45
rendered. In United States v. Scott, the trial court granted the
defendant’s mid-trial motion to dismiss drug charges based on
46
prejudice due to pre-indictment delay. The state sought to appeal the
dismissal, but the Sixth Circuit held that the Double Jeopardy Clause
47
barred any further prosecution. The Supreme Court reversed,
distinguishing the case on the basis that there had been no findings as
48
to the defendant’s guilt or innocence. The Court held that the
underlying principles and purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause
are not implicated where the trial court ruling is unrelated to issues of
49
the defendant’s culpability.
In the Supreme Court’s last term, it considered the scope of
double jeopardy protection in the context of a jury trial in Blueford v.
50
Arkansas. During deliberations in that case, the foreperson reported
to the trial judge that the jury “was unanimous against guilt on capital
murder and first-degree murder, was deadlocked on manslaughter,
51
and had not voted on negligent homicide.” The jury continued to
deliberate but was unable to reach a verdict, and a mistrial was
52
declared. The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not
53
bar retrial of the defendant on the murder charges. In the majority’s

44. See id. at 468–69 (applying the Martin Linen standard and holding that “what matters
is that, as the Massachusetts Rules authorize, the judge evaluated the [Commonwealth’s]
evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction” (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
45. 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
46. Id. at 84.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 100–01 (allowing the prosecution to appeal the trial court’s ruling because no
Double Jeopardy Clause-protected interest has been invaded when “the defendant himself
seeks to have the trial terminated without any submission to either judge or jury as to his guilt
or innocence”).
49. See id. at 95–96 (deciding that “the underlying purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause” are not pertinent to a defendant who seeks termination “not because of his assertion
that the Government has failed to make out a case against him, but because of a legal claim that
the Government’s case against him must fail even though it might satisfy the trier of fact that he
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”).
50. 132 S. Ct. 2044 (2012).
51. Id. at 2048.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2053.
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view, “the foreperson’s report was not a final resolution of
54
anything” —the defendant was neither convicted nor acquitted of the
murder charges—and therefore the Double Jeopardy Clause did not
55
preclude retrial.
B. Michigan Supreme Court Holding
Considering U.S. Supreme Court precedent on the Double
Jeopardy Clause as well as the public policy interests involved, the
Michigan Supreme Court in Evans held that the State was not barred
from retrying Evans following the trial judge’s misconstruction of the
56
criminal statute under which Evans was charged.
At the core of the holding was the Michigan Supreme Court’s
conclusion that the trial judge’s ruling did not constitute an acquittal
warranting protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court
looked to Martin Linen as the foundation for determining whether a
57
ruling is an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes. In particular, the
court found that Martin Linen set forth the definition of an acquittal
as “a ruling of the judge, whatever its label, [that] actually represents a
resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the
58
offense charged.” Because the trial court erroneously required that
the prosecution establish an element of the charged offense that did
not actually exist, the Michigan Supreme Court found that the trial
59
court never ruled on any of the factual elements required by statute.
Moreover, since the trial court’s ruling was based on this “extraneous
element,” the Michigan Supreme Court found that the trial court
60
never reached the question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.
The Michigan Supreme Court distinguished the legal error
committed in this case from the factual errors in cases that extended

54. Id. at 2050.
55. Id. at 2053. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, asserted that
the majority opinion effectively gave “the State what the Constitution withholds: the proverbial
second bite at the apple.” Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. People v. Evans, 810 N.W.2d 535, 548–49 (Mich. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Evans v.
Michigan, 132 S. Ct. 2753 (U.S. June 11, 2012) (No. 11-1327).
57. Id. at 540–41.
58. Id. at 546 (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571
(1977)).
59. See id. (agreeing with the court of appeals that because the trial court incorrectly
added an extra element to the charged offense, it “did not resolve or even address any factual
element necessary to establish a conviction for burning other real property”).
60. Id.
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61

double jeopardy protection. According to the court, in Rumsey,
Smalis, and Smith, the trial courts had made evidentiary errors
relating to the proof required to establish factual elements of the
62
charged offenses. Though the court noted that the rulings in those
cases “were based on the prosecution’s failure to prove something
that the law did not actually require it to prove,” the “key distinction”
was that the trial courts in those cases resolved at least one of the
63
factual elements of the charged offense. In contrast, the trial judge’s
ruling in Evans’s case was “entirely focused on the extraneous
64
element” that the trial judge grafted onto the statutory offense. Thus,
in the court’s view, there was a “constitutionally meaningful
65
difference” between the post-Martin Linen cases and the current
case before the court. Here, the trial court’s error effectively
66
dismissed the case without resolving any factual elements.
The Michigan Supreme Court also discussed the policy concerns
underlying its holding. Interpreting the outer bounds of “acquittal”
requires the balancing of two competing interests. The first is the
State’s “interest in having one full and fair opportunity to prosecute a
67
criminal case.” This interest weighs in favor of a narrow
interpretation of “acquittal.” The second is the “interest in protecting
a criminal defendant from being subjected ‘to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of
68
anxiety and insecurity’” about his adjudication. This interest weighs
in favor of a broader interpretation of “acquittal.” In balancing the
interests in this case, the Michigan Supreme Court found that the
public policy interest in allowing the State to present its case weighed
heavily, while retrying Evans did not invoke the kinds of hazards
69
warranting double jeopardy protection. As a result, the Michigan
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s reversal of the trial
court ruling, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar

61. Id. at 543.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 543 n.39.
64. Id. at 546.
65. Id. at 543.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 548.
68. Id. (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187–88 (1957)).
69. See id. (“[T]he people have not been afforded the opportunity to have their case
reviewed for the sufficiency of the evidence on the factual elements even once. Permitting
retrial to allow such an opportunity hardly depicts an all-powerful state relentlessly pursuing a
defendant . . . .”).
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70

Evans’s retrial.

IV. ARGUMENTS
A. Evans’s Argument
Evans contends that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the State
from retrying him because the trial court’s judgment of directed
verdict was an acquittal, despite the legal error involved. First, Evans
argues that the trial court’s ruling implicates Double Jeopardy Clause
protection because the court essentially rendered a finding that he
71
was not culpable for the charged offense. Asserting that Martin
Linen and Scott “established a bright line between acquittals and
72
other judicial decisions terminating a criminal proceeding,” Evans
argues that the ruling clearly resolved the question of his guilt or
73
innocence and was thus an acquittal. Evans notes that the trial judge
evaluated the criminal statute, jury instructions and its commentary,
74
and the State’s evidence before issuing her ruling. Because the trial
judge found the evidence “legally insufficient to sustain a
75
conviction,” Evans asserts that “the ruling, correct or not, was
76
entirely about [his] innocence of the charged offense.” Thus, Evans
concludes that permitting a retrial would be unconstitutional and
inconsistent with the Court’s prior holdings in analogous cases.
Second, Evans argues that the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision
is an “attempt to carve out an ‘extra element’ exception to the
77
definition of ‘acquittal,’” and as such is an unworkable precedent. In
Evans’s view, requiring the State to prove facts to support a
misconstruction of the law—held sufficient to bar retrial in Rumsey,
Smalis, and Smith—is functionally equivalent to requiring the State to
78
prove an element the trial court added to the statutory requirements.
79
Both errors “increase[] the prosecution’s burden” and when either
such error results in the court terminating trial proceedings, the ruling
70. Id. at 548–49.
71. Brief for Petitioner at 9, Evans v. Michigan, No. 11-1327 (U.S. Aug. 15, 2012).
72. Id. at 11.
73. See id. at 14 (“The trial judge’s ruling in Petitioner’s case was manifestly on the ‘guilt
or innocence’ side of the line drawn in Scott and Martin Linen.”).
74. Id. at 14–15.
75. Id. at 15 (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572 (1977)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 20.
78. Id. at 27.
79. Id.
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constitutes an acquittal barring retrial under the Double Jeopardy
80
Clause. Evans further contends that upholding the Michigan
Supreme Court’s “extra element” exception would “seriously
undermine the core Double Jeopardy Clause protection against post81
acquittal proceedings,” opening the door to prosecutorial appeals
every time a trial judge orders a mid-trial directed verdict based on
82
legal interpretations with which the prosecution disagrees. The
prosecution could characterize the judge’s interpretation as the
addition of an extra, non-existent element, thereby forcing appellate
courts to review the decision, and thus undermining the finality of
83
proceedings for already-tried defendants.
B. State’s Argument
The State argues that the trial judge’s legal error at Evans’s trial
was not an acquittal barring retrial. According to the State, this case is
fundamentally distinguishable from Martin Linen and successive case
law, because the errors in those cases affected the factual resolution of
84
the charged offense. The error here, by contrast, precluded the judge
or jury from resolving any of the factual elements required by
85
statute. In the State’s view, requiring that the structure burned be a
dwelling is “no more related to ‘factual guilt or innocence’ of the
offense charged than a requirement that the structure burned be
86
blue.” Because the trial judge required the prosecution to prove
87
something that was indisputably not an element and because this
error provided the basis for the judge’s ruling, the State argues that
88
the ruling cannot be characterized as an acquittal.

80. See id. at 27–28 (“[T]he fundamental Double Jeopardy Clause bar on further
proceedings cannot turn on such a distinction.”).
81. Id. at 28.
82. Id.
83. See id. (“Allowing such an appeal would frustrate the interest of the accused in having
an end to the proceedings against him.” (quoting Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145
(1986))).
84. See Brief for the Respondent at 13–14, Evans v. Michigan, No. 11-1327 (U.S. Oct. 5,
2012) (arguing that under the Martin Linen test, a judicial resolution based on “something other
than one or more of the constituent parts of the crime charged . . . is not an acquittal, and
jeopardy does not bar appeal and retrial”).
85. Id. at 24.
86. Id. at 16–17.
87. See id. at 6 (“The trial court wrongly added an extraneous element to the statute under
which the Petitioner was charged, and terminated the trial . . . by finding an absence of proof on
this extraneous or faux element . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
88. Id. at 9.
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The State’s brief also appeals to the policy justifications for the
Double Jeopardy Clause and contends that they are not present in
this case. At the outset, the State notes that the ruling resulted from
Evans’s motion seeking termination of the trial proceedings and
argues that as a result “[t]he case involves no attempt to harass the
defendant through repeated prosecutions, as all the State seeks is one
89
full and fair opportunity to have the case decided by a jury.”
According to the State, the double jeopardy hazards of a powerful
90
state oppressing an individual are simply not present in Evans’s case.
In the State’s view, adopting Evans’s position effectively “turns the
91
storied protections of the Jeopardy Clause into a parlor trick.”
V. ANALYSIS
In order for Evans to prevail, he needs to convince the Court that
the trial court’s legal error in his case is no different from the factual
errors in other decisions that were held to be unreviewable acquittals
warranting double jeopardy protection. In addition to examining the
contours of Martin Linen and its successive cases, the Court is likely
to consider the competing public policy issues involved. On one side is
the fundamental protection the Constitution provides to defendants
whose guilt the state fails to prove from being tried twice for the same
92
offense and the public interest in finality in judicial proceedings. On
the other side is the need for proper adjudication in criminal trials
and the arguable lack of double jeopardy dangers. In light of the
Court’s long-standing precedent recognizing Double Jeopardy Clause
protection even in incorrect judicial resolutions, the State faces an
uphill battle.
However, even if the Court finds for Evans, it most likely did not
grant certiorari simply to reverse the Michigan Supreme Court and

89. Id. at 5–6.
90. See id. at 55 (“[W]here the government appeals in this situation ‘the state is not
attempting to wear the accused out by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials . . . . This is
not cruelty at all, nor even vexation in any immoderate degree.’” (quoting Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937))). More broadly, the State urges the Supreme Court to reconsider its
treatment of judicial acquittals as functionally equivalent to jury acquittals for double jeopardy
purposes. See id. at 35 (arguing that “reconsideration of the foundations of Martin Linen is
appropriate” in light of the historical common law origins of the Double Jeopardy Clause).
91. Id. at 33.
92. See Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 11, Evans v. Michigan, No. 11-1327 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2012) (“The error
was not [Evans’s]; he merely asked the judge to declare his lack of guilt, which the judge did.”).
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93

correct a perceived error. Rather, the Court may clarify the scope of
Martin Linen’s standard, especially since the Michigan Supreme
Court’s decision was the latest in a number of lower court opinions
concluding that Martin Linen does not apply to particular legal errors
94
committed by trial courts.
The Court will likely hold the trial judge’s ruling to be an
acquittal. Procedurally, there is very little difference between the
specific legal error committed in Evans’s trial and the errors at issue
in the Martin Linen line of cases. In Evans’s trial, the judge issued her
ruling under Michigan Court Rule 6.419(A), enabling the court to
“direct a verdict of acquittal on any charged offense as to which the
evidence is insufficient to support conviction” after the close of the
95
prosecution’s case-in-chief. In Smith, the Supreme Court looked to
similar procedural language to support its conclusion that the trial
96
judge’s ruling was indeed an acquittal. The trial court in that case
had ruled under Massachusetts Rule of Criminal Procedure 25(a),
directing a finding of not guilty following the close of the
prosecution’s case “if the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to
97
sustain a conviction.” The Court held that the trial court’s order met
the Martin Linen definition of an acquittal “consistently used in our
98
double-jeopardy cases.”
Additionally, the Court faces the potential of setting uncertain
precedent if it were to recognize an exception in its double jeopardy
jurisprudence for the erroneous ruling in Evans’s case. If the Court
agrees with the Michigan Supreme Court that the trial judge’s ruling
93. See, e.g., Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits of the Olympian Court: Common Law Judging
versus Error Correction in the Supreme Court, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 271, 272 (2006)
(discussing “the Court’s long struggle to control its caseload to avoid being (or being viewed as)
a court whose primary role is to correct errors made by lower courts”).
94. The Third Circuit, citing other circuits, asserted that the Martin Linen test “require[s]
an acquittal only when, in terminating the proceeding, the trial court actually resolves in favor
of the defendant a factual element necessary for a criminal conviction.” United States v. Maker,
751 F.2d 614, 622 (3d Cir. 1984). Under this interpretation, the court concluded that a trial
court’s dismissal of an indictment did not constitute an acquittal because it was based on the
court’s legally erroneous determination that the indictment’s allegations were insufficient. Id. at
623–24. More recently, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the state was not barred from
retrying a defendant following a directed verdict of acquittal, because the ruling was legally, not
factually, erroneous: the magistrate judge had required the state to prove a legitimate reason for
asking the defendant to leave public property, when the statute did not contain such an element.
See State v. Korsen, 69 P.3d 126, 136–37 (Idaho 2003).
95. MICH. CT. R. 6.419(A).
96. Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467–68 (2005).
97. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a).
98. Smith, 543 U.S. at 467–68.
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was not an acquittal, it would essentially create an exception not just
for a misinterpretation of law, but a particular kind of
misinterpretation. After all, the Court has declined to recognize
exceptions for trial court errors such as misinterpretations of
99
100
statutory definitions,
capital sentencing law,
and witness
101
testimony. The Court has not demonstrated a willingness to carve
out such a fact-intensive exception as it would need to in Evans.
Instead, the wide range of erroneous rulings foreclosing retrial
reflects the Court’s hesitation to withhold double jeopardy protection
from defendants whom courts have found innocent.
Moreover, as a policy matter, if the Court were to uphold the
Michigan Supreme Court’s ruling, the decision may open the door to
all manner of unpredictable double jeopardy exceptions. Perhaps the
standard would be fairly easy to apply in circumstances such as this,
where the trial judge announces (incorrectly) the precise element she
has read into the criminal statute and believes the prosecution has
failed to prove. However, in less clear-cut cases, affirming the
Michigan Supreme Court could create more confusion in the Court’s
102
already fraught double jeopardy jurisprudence. The Court would
need to proceed carefully, identifying the specific requirements that
distinguish a judicial decision from one that substantively “represents
a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of
103
the offense charged.” For example, would a new rule only apply
when, as in this case, neither party disputes that a factual element the
prosecution was required to prove was actually not part of the
statutory offense? While attaching such limitations may lend clarity, it
would likely raise the question of how useful such a cabined rule
would be. Lower courts would also likely find an “extra element” legal
error exemption to double jeopardy protection difficult to apply,

99. See Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 141, 144 n.7 (1986) (extending double
jeopardy protection even though the trial court may have required the incorrect level of
recklessness); see also supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
100. See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 205 (1984) (extending double jeapardy
protection even though the trial court misinterpreted the requirements for an aggravating
circumstance for capital sentencing); see also supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
101. See Smith, 543 U.S. at 465 (extending double jeopardy protection even though the trial
court misjudged the adequacy of the witness’s testimony in proving one of the elements); see
also supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., William S. McAninch, Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy, 44 S.C. L.
REV. 411, 465–66 (1993) (discussing the complicated case law behind the Double Jeopardy
Clause’s protection against multiple prosecutions for the same offense).
103. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977).
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especially in cases involving erroneous rulings that fall somewhere in
the spectrum between Evans and the Martin Linen line of cases.
Ultimately, following the Martin Linen standard, the distinction that
should matter to the Court is whether the trial judge decided on the
104
defendant’s culpability (either legal or factual).
Granted, there is an uneasy quality to the factual circumstances of
this case, as one may sense that Evans is not the kind of defendant the
Double Jeopardy Clause aims to protect. The undercurrent of the
Michigan Supreme Court’s holding is that prohibiting the State from
retrying Evans serves no strong public policy interest, but rather,
105
harms the public interest. This discomfort with extending Double
Jeopardy Clause protection in the wake of the particular legal error
committed reflects the criticism of one constitutional scholar: “We do
not demand that the defendant go free because the initial jurors catch
fever and a new trial is ordered; why should things be any different if
106
a fevered judge makes egregiously wrong legal rulings at trial?”
While the Court will be concerned about eroding the Double
Jeopardy Clause’s fundamental protections, not allowing retrial in this
case could arguably present just such an erosion.
VI. CONCLUSION
Though compelling public policy justifications support the
Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in this case, the State faces an
uphill battle in the appeal before the U.S. Supreme Court. Many
Supreme Court decisions have extended double jeopardy protection
in cases of erroneous acquittals, and the State will need to persuade
the Court that the erroneous path taken to end Evans’s trial is
definitively distinguishable from those cases. The State’s task may
prove to be insurmountable. Though the circumstances of this case do
not provide a particularly strong illustration of the Double Jeopardy
Clause’s necessity and justifications, the Court is nonetheless likely to

104. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 101 (1978) (holding that the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not protect a defendant who seeks to terminate trial proceedings “without any
submission to either judge or jury as to his guilt or innocence”).
105. See People v. Evans, 810 N.W.2d 535, 548 (Mich. 2012) cert. granted sub nom. Evans v.
Michigan, 132 S. Ct. 2753 (U.S. June 11, 2012) (No. 11-1327) (“[A] court’s adding an extraneous
element and resolving the case solely on the basis of that added element prevents any
evaluation of the charged crime on the merits and thus completely thwarts society’s interest in
allowing the prosecution one full and fair opportunity to present its case.”).
106. Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807, 1845
(1997).
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find that Evans’s culpability has been decided. Upholding the decision
would require the Court to articulate a substantive difference
between legally and factually erroneous trial court rulings, a
distinction with scant foundation in the Court’s double jeopardy
jurisprudence thus far.

